Originally published in French on March 19, 2025
Taline Papazian, political scientist, lecturer at Sciences Po and director of API, was interviewed by Ani Paitjan for CivilNet on March 18, 2025, about the “agreement on the text” between Armenia and Azerbaijan announced on the 13th of March. While a joint text has been validated, it remains to be seen whether Baku will go through with it. What progress has been made at this stage? What is next?
The gist of the interview, in brief.
Q: On 13 March, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to move forward with the peace process. Can we really believe in Azerbaijan’s goodwill?
A: Avoid speculations about the intentions of Ilham Aliev, who we know has far more reasons than Nikol Pashinyan for not wanting a peace agreement. Acknowledge that, notwithstanding these intentions, the fact that a text on which both parties agree is in itself a real step forward, given the longevity of the conflict.
The stages now facing the two parties are signature, ratification and implementation. Each of these stages contains potential to delay or even derail the agreement.
On the Yerevan side, strong political and strategic reasons led Armenian diplomacy to make it possible to agree on a text, thereby undermining Baku’s desired tactic of deadlock. It should be remembered that it is Yerevan that needs peace in order to emerge from the uncertainty of permanent no war/no peace and open up solid prospects for economic development for the entire region. Armenian diplomacy has therefore made the majority of efforts to achieve this.
Q: The two main points of the agreement concern the exclusion of third-party forces from the border and the abandonment of international legal proceedings. Why were these so important to Azerbaijan?
A: Exclusion of third-party forces, targeting the European observation mission (EUMA) Although this is a simple observation mission, civilian and unarmed, and although it could be argued that it should not be described as a force, it is well known that Baku is highly critical of this mission and spreads misinformation about it, and wants it to leave. Baku’s litany of allegations against it ranges from interference to destabilisation of the ceasefire.
Yerevan is ready to make this concession to a certain extent, but this does not mean an immediate withdrawal of observers from the border. The stages of signature and ratification will need to be completed first, and then see exactly how this point will be implemented.
Abandonment of international legal proceedings: Armenia and Azerbaijan have several cases against each other pending before international courts. Armenia of course has legitimate and particularly serious claims relating to war crimes, violations of international humanitarian law and racial discrimination. However, it cannot be ruled out that Azerbaijan does not have a few cases of its own, whether in connection with the 600,000 Azerbaijani refugees from the first war or environmental issues relating to the exploitation of certain soil resources in Nagorno-Karabakh.
As far as we know, the agreement provides for a reciprocal withdrawal of complaints. From a pragmatic point of view, peace is not always justice, and in the present case, Yerevan is seeking at this stage to emerge from the regime of war, not to enter the regime of justice or reconciliation.
Q: That same evening, the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister mentioned amendments to the Armenian Constitution and the dissolution of the Minsk Group as preconditions for the signing. Armenia immediately rejected these demands. Has the agreement got off to a bad start?
A: Azerbaijan is tempted to look for pretexts not to sign and will find some.
There is a risk of reliving the scenario of the Armenian-Turkish protocols, where after signature, preconditions set by Ankara caused the process to fail in its ratification phase.
The importance of international pressure: it is to be hoped that outside powers, Washington and/or the EU, will strongly encourage Baku to sign the agreement.
Ankara’s role deserves to be emphasised: Turkey has played a discreet and positive role in the current phase, and it is to be hoped that this will continue. Ankara has economic reasons for preferring a peaceful and economically open South Caucasus to a South Caucasus blocked and locked in the current phase; all the more so in view of the reaffirmation of Russian interests in the region.
Q: Where do Turkey and Russia fit into this process? What role can the United States play?
A: Russia is the most worried about an agreement that would effectively put an end to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow has reacted by offering to host the rest of the negotiations, i.e. to regain control of the process.
A peace agreement, especially one reached bilaterally, will strengthen the sovereignty of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The United States could play a decisive positive role. Whether or not one appreciates President Trump’s approach to ‘peace’, it is undeniable that the current US administration wants to rid itself of a number of conflicts. It is up to Armenian diplomacy to seize this opportunity to push in the right direction and encourage Baku to move forward.
Ankara and Moscow prefer regionalisation, but their interests do not coincide. More generally, Yerevan must continue to nurture and diversify its relations with Europe and the United States in order to counter Russian pressure.
Q: Since the war of 2020, security has been a crucial issue. Are we talking solely about armament or a broader strategy?
A: Security is not just about borders and armaments. Yerevan has still not revised its ‘national security strategy’ despite all the events that have taken place since 2020.
It is understandable that the Pashinyan government is walking a tightrope and that the precipice beneath the Republic of Armenia is deep.
Thus, faced with regular accusations of ‘revanchism’ and certain fanciful and grotesque demands, such as returning purchased weapons, Yerevan firmly reaffirms its right to defend itself, without giving Baku any pretext to launch military operations. [Editor’s note: On this subject, Yerevan has said and repeated that it is proposing the establishment of a joint mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations and that it is ‘still awaiting Azerbaijan’s response.’]
Yerevan has an interest in actively collaborating with other countries that have based their security on managing asymmetric situations and are identified potential partners (the Baltic states, particularly Estonia, and the Nordic countries, particularly Finland) in order to accelerate the modernisation of its national security strategy. Security concerns all citizens. The simple objective is to rapidly and reasonably increase the cost of war against Armenia in order to make negotiation preferable to aggression. Armenian diplomacy must work with its European partners to reinforce this approach.
Full interview in French here.