In the “Dilemme” programme on 15 June 2025 focusing onregional security, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan outlined Turkey’s priorities and expectations regarding the normalisation process with Armenia. Ceylan, a former Turkish ambassador and director of the Ankara Center for Political Studies, served as Turkey’s NATO representative from 2013 to 2018 before retiring in 2019. Both in this interview and in an article published on July 14, 2025 Think Tank website, he provides clear insight into how Ankara envisions establishing bilateral relations.
With the prospect of joining the European Union now firmly set aside, Turkey has spent the past fifteen years broadening its network of foreign partnerships and refocusing on its long-standing ambition to become a major regional power. During the refugee crisis—a period when the issue of migration gave Ankara significan diplomatic leverage in its negotiations with the European Union—Turkey succeeded in positioning itself as a geostrategic pivot. This achievement was due, in large part, to the remarkable leap forward of its defence industry. Today, this influence extends from the Middle East to the South Caucasus, and even, to some extent, as far as Ukraine.
Leapfrogging refers to the phenomenon where a country skips over intermediate stages of development to adopt the most advanced technologies directly. In the case of Turkey’s defence industry, this strategy has resulted in the production of advanced combat drones such as the Bayraktar TB2 and cutting-edge weapons systems, made possible through targeted know-how transfers, strategic alliances, and significant investment in military R&D. This approach has allowed Ankara to rapidly become a key arms exporter, competing with long-established powers while avoiding the decades-long process of industrial evolution that Western countries have experienced. These major technological advances, along with the diversification of Turkey’s diplomatic partnerships since the 2010s, have made the country a sought-after player in all international coalitions—from NATO to Russia. The Bayraktar TB2, widely used by Azerbaijan against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, and later by the Ukrainians—who even dedicated a popular song to it in 2022—has helped establish Turkey as a leading exporter of military hardware.
Turkish conditions for normalisation
In the Caucasus, Turkey has positioned itself as a central actor, particularly during the 2020 conflict. Since then, the process of establishing bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey has been relaunched, and it was in this context that the former ambassador was invited to appear on the Dilemma programme.
Ceylan firmly stands that “the only precondition for Armenian-Turkish dialogue should be the signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan.” He emphasized the importance of Armenia’s “four principles”—sovereignty, jurisdiction, equality, and reciprocity—as a framework for opening communication channels, considering them fully compatible with international law. It is worth noting that recognition of the genocide committed by the Ottomans from 1915 onwards—a demand that had previously been held up as a condition—is no longer on the agenda.
Economic issues and limits to rapprochement
Regarding economic issues, Ceylan offered a sobering assessment: the ongoing depreciation of the Turkish lira has significantly reduced purchasing power, pushing back the prospect of meaningful economic recovery to 2026. He advocated for renewed investment in the region and in Europe, pointing out that 60% of Turkey’s trade remains directed toward the European Union. He also highlighted the potential benefits of an integrated economic corridor connecting Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. However, it appears unlikely that Armenia will be able to play a significant role in these new connectivity agreements, which have so far been concluded without its involvement— and this, even if the border with Azerbaijan were to reopen. This reality limits the mutual benefits of rapprochement, particularly in economic terms. On the Armenian side, it is in fact bilateral trade agreements that are more likely to provide economic gains.
Wrapping up his remarks, Ceylan made his position clear: “Plan A is the rapid signing of the peace and connectivity agreements; any delay would only fuel regional instability.” This statement sums up Turkey’s current stance: for now, the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey remains entirely dependent on the signing of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan—the terms and outcome of which remain uncertain.